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FAIRNESS AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: APPLYING
EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES TO
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES IN HENDRICKS AND
M.L.B.*
Larry Cat Backert
We speak the unifying language of fairness in law-making in the late
twentieth century. This is the age of due process. The language offairness
provides the unifying glue to our law making.1
It is almost a cliche today that, at its limit, all legal categories explode. It
is also a commonplace that legal categories tend to be shoved to their limit over
the course of time, unless the categories are redefined or destroyed by the
weight of their own expansiveness.2 These quasi-biological truisms affect not
only statutory and common law legal categories, but increasingly, constitutional
categories as well. Categories begin as sharply defined and well understood de-
scriptions of sets of objects or conclusions. Over time, these categories are
necessarily molded, in accordance with the political and socio-cultural expedi-
ency of the moment, to encompass ever more different and greater objects
within the originally sharply drawn categories. At some point, every category
becomes it own contradiction. The category becomes so amorphous that it can
logically contain itself and its opposite. At that point the category becomes
useless; it becomes something virtually undefinable in any containable sense.
Thus expanded, it is emptied of meaning At this point, as statute, it is aban-
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the 1996 Supreme Court
Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, October 31, 1997.
t Professor of Law and Co-Director, Comparative and International Law Center, University of TulsaCollege of Law. My thanks to Marty Belsky and Melissa Koehn for their comments, and to my research
assistants Charles Keckler, Denise Jones, and Michael Romano for superlative work. Lastly, my thanks toKurston P. McMurray, Telisa Webb Schelin, and John J. Baroni and the staff of the Tulsa Law Journal for
always going the extra mile.
1. Larry CatA Backer, Religion as Object and the Grammar of Law, 81 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming
1998).
2. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349 (1982).
3. Ironically, originalism is meant to contain this process by building limits to interpretation.Originalism invites a form of Constitutional hermeneuties very similar to Biblical hermeneutics. As such,
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doned-led to that graveyard of historical curiosities in the Official Statutes of
most jurisdictions.4 However, when this process affects constitutional law there
is no graveyard to which to lead this now exploded category. Instead, empty, it
continues to serve as an expedient; it becomes a code, shorthand for new cate-
gories which emerge necessarily from the ruins.
This term the Supreme Court has once again demonstrated the verities of
these truisms in two spectacularly if deceptively bathetic, cases: M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., s and Kansas v. Hendricks.6 Both cases deal with the fairness of depriva-
tions. In one case, private individuals sought to use the instrumentalities of the
state to deprive a woman of her rights as birth mother. In the other case, an
instrumentality of the state sought to deprive a person of his liberty by adjudg-
ing him a "sexual predator."
From out of our tradition of constitutionalism and the Justices' "sense" of
the drift of the document,7 or from out of the "eternal verities" with which the
originalism does not eliminate the need for interpretation, and perhaps for interpretive leaps, originalism mere-
ly focuses and narrows the range within which those interpretive exercises may be conducted. A good exam-
ple of generally agreed originalism is seventh amendment jurisprudence which requires even the most pro-
gressive of us to focus on the world at the time of the creation of the amendment. See, e.g., Chauffeurs v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
4. The codes of most states are littered with such provisions. Consider the blasphemy statutes of Okla-
homa, for example. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 901 (1991) ("Blasphemy consists in wantonly uttering or pub-
lishing words, casting contumelious reproach or profane ridicule upon God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the
Holy Scriptures or the Christian or any other religion.").
5. 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996). In M.L.B., a Mississippi Chancery Court handed down a decree terminating
the mother's parental rights to her two children. See id. at 559-60. The mother (M.L.B.) filed a timely appeal
from the termination decree, but Mississippi law required her to make a prepayment for "preparing and trans-
mitting the record." Id. at 560. Unable to meet the required prepayment (approximately $2,400.00), M.L.B.
sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See id. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application,
holding that no right to proceed informapauperis exists in civil appeals. See id. M.L.B. petitioned the United
States Supreme Court on the theory that, conditioning an appeal from decrees which terminate parental rights
on the parent's ability to pay record preparation fees was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Justice Ginsburg authored a five-member majority opinion that
agreed with M.L.B.
Justice Thomas based his dissent primarily on his concern that the majority's holding is not limited to
the termination of parental rights. Accordingly, he believes it "inevitable" that the majority's "new-found
constitutional right to free transcripts in civil appeals" will lead to massive demands on the states to provide
"free assistane ... to appellants in all manner of civil cases .... Id. at 570-71 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
6. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). In Hendricks, Kansas filed a petition under the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act to commit Hendricks, who had a history of sexually molesting children and was scheduled for
release from prison shortly after the Act became law. See id. at 2076. After a trial, a jury determined
Hendricks to be a "sexually violent predator" and the court ordered him to an undetermined period of time in
civil confinement, pursuant to the Kansas Act. See id. Hendricks appealed on the grounds of "Substantive"
Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto. See id. The Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act,
holding its pre-commitment requisites to be inconsistent with the notion of "substantive" due process, and the
state of Kansas petitioned for certiorari. See id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed the Kansas Supreme Court. See id. at 2086.
Justice Thomas wrote the five justice majority opinion, holding (1) the Act's pre-commitment condi-
tions satisfy "substantive" due process requirements, and (2) the Act does not violate either the Constitution's
Double Jeopardy clause or its prohibition on ex post facto lawmaking. See id. at 2086.
Justice Breyer's dissent, however, contends that the Kansas Act is not merely an attempt to commit
Hendricks civilly, but an effort to "inflict further punishment upon him." Id. at 2088. Thus, Justice Breyer
concludes, the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution prohibits the Act's applicability to Hendricks. See id.
7. This notion is nicely encapsulated in the view of those who see the Constitution as a "living" con-
struction. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BicKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR or PoLITIcs 236-39 (1962). Though Bickel speaks of applying general principles, the notion is aggres-
2
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document is said to have been infused at the time of its crafting,8 our Court has
been fashioning important general principles of Constitutional law. Among the
most important, and least acknowledged, is the constitutional principle of fair-
ness.
In the "Process" cases of the last Term we see, reconfirmed, what we had
suspected for some time: the categories "due process" and "equal protection"
have become meaningless. We have known this for a long time with respect to
that illogical, oxymoronic and legally untenable construct "substantive" due
process. We now see the Justices of the Supreme Court expose, in a blas6 sort
of way, the truth that these categories mean nothing. We keep them because we
must-they are the words in our Scripture. But we apply them interchangeably
as something new; we use their overtones and penumbras to do equity. In our
constitutional hermeneutics, we have sacrificed the rule making of the law
courts for the auctoritas9 of the chancellor-almost a contradiction of terms.
The implications of the emerging (if shifting) majority of the Rehnquist Court
is now clear: just as the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") revolutionized
Constitutionalism in the European Union by the crafting of so-called "general
principles of Community law,""° our Supreme Court has constructed general
principles of Constitutional law.
The difference between the ECJ and the American Supreme Court is subtle
but significant: the ECJ has made its crafting of general principles of Communi-
ty law an explicit part of its jurisprudence; the American Supreme Court contin-
ues to hide its similar enterprise behind an increasingly ill-fitting, black-letter
constitutional jurisprudence. In the final analysis, however, the courts in both
systems are engaged in the same enterprise. Whether the enterprise of construct-
ing extra-constitutional principles is a good thing I leave for another day. The
purpose of this piece is not to advocate or support those who decry so-called
judicial activism or who disingenuously whine about a "liberal" judiciary "out
of control." Liberals and conservatives both necessarily indulge in the practice
of applying extra-constitutional, interpretive principles to constitutional cases.
sive and forward looking, and can, rightly, I think, be recast as a political model of judging. The danger of
this notion is in the possibility of losing the singular tie between the applied principle and the primary text.
8. Originalism, like liberal "relativism," is an excellent source of constitutional activism. The object
here is "purity" rather than "conformity to modernity," but the result is the same. Both objectives must fit
within a social, cultural and technological world different from that which preceded it. On the originalist
enterprise, see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
9. "It was only thus, by originating and instigating public policy, by being an auctor publici consilii,
that the Roman politician could attain the highest form of prestige, auctoritas." DONALD C. EARL, THE MOR-
AL AND PoLmcAL TRADrON OF ROME 33 (1967). Auctoritas has assumed complex levels of meaning in the
West. On the development of the notion of auctoritas in the Western legal tradition, see Charles W. Collier,
Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 771, 805-09 (authority derived from
original text or primary source). "The writings of an auctur contained, or possessed, auctoritas, in the abstract
sense of the term, with its strong connotations of veracity and sagacity .... [A]s Aristotle says, an auctoritas
is a judgment of the wise man in his chosen discipline." AUSiiR J. MiNms, MEDmVAL THEORY OF AUTHOR-
sfup 10 (1984).
10. For a succinct explanation of the meaning and place of "general principles" of Community Law in
the European Union, see D. LASOK AND J.W. BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES 179 (5h ed. 1991). See discussion, infra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
1997]
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My only quarrel today is with the American Court's failure to be explicit about
what it is doing. I emphasize, however, that the habit of such construction is as
deeply embedded in "traditionalist" justices" as it is in "progressive" justic-
es.'
2
In M.L.B., the constitutional principle of fairness required the provision of
needs-based waivers of record preparation fees in appeals from decisions termi-
nating the parental rights of women. The five member majority of the Court
melded overtones from the dicta in a series of due process and equal protection
cases to arrive at this result. 3 "A 'precise rationale' has not been com-
posed,... because cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy
slogans or pigeonhole analysis .... ""4 The constitutional principle of fairness
now requires what will amount to a heightened scrutiny of any cases "involving
state controls or intrusions on family relations."'" In the name of the constitu-
tional principle of fairness, the Court would have us borrow from the failed
"fairness" notions in sex discrimination pay cases and import a "comparable
worth" standard. 6 Comparable worth fairness requires the courts to value civil
11. It was a conservative court, after all, which birthed that constitutional principle we refer to as "sub-
stantive" due process. On the birth and "death" of economic substantive due process, see ROBERT BORK, THE
TEPTNG OF AMEmCA: THE PoLmcAL SEDUCTON OF THE LAW 3032 (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEmOCRA-
cY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 14-21 (1980); Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was
Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1049 (1997) (expounding a revolution-
ist view). For a discussion of modem conservative activism, see Bernard Schwartz, 'Brennan v. Rehnquist'
Mirror Images in Constitutional Construction, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 213 (1994).
12. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, What the Warren Court Has Meant To America, in THE WARREN
COURT. A RETROSPECriVE 390 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1996).
13. The majority consisted of Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Breyer, in an opinion authored by
Justice Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which he, without much explanation, sub-
stantially expanded the reach of the teachings of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
14. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608 (1974) and
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983)).
15. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564.
16. The notion of equal pay for equivalent work has had a spotty history in this country, See, e.g.,
American Nurses' Association v. illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7' Cir. 1986) (Equal Pay Act not violated by failing
to construct wage scales based on notions of comparable worth). On the other hand, notions of comparable
worth have become well accepted in the jurisprudence of the European Union. See TREATY ESTABLISING
THE EUROPEAN ECONONC CoMMUNirnr, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. [EEC Treaty] art. 119:
The principle of equal pay for men and women outlined in Art. 119 of the Treaty .... means for the
same work or for work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on
grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration. In particular, where a job
classification system is used for determining pay, it must be based on the same criteria for both men
and women and so drawn up as to exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex.
Council Directive 75/117, art. 119, 1975 OJ. (L 45) 19 (On the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for Men and Women). For amendments prior
to the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, see TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIS (EC Off'1 Pub. Off., 1987). The full text of the last amendment to the EC Treaty, the TREATY ON EURO-
PEAN UNION, along with the text of the EC Treaty as amended, can be found at 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1, 1
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
Justice Ginsburg would have us apply the principle of comparable worth in a context in which it has
never been used explicitly. She would have use decide whether the "value" of criminal penalties is compara-
ble to that of parental termination. See, e.g., Sandra J. Libeson, Reviving the Comparable Worth Debate in the
United States: A Look Toward the European Community, 16 COM. LABOR L. J. 358 (1995). For a critique of
the European approach, see Jill Andrews, Comment National and International Sources of Women's Rights to
Equal Employment Opportunities: Equality in Law Versus Equality in Fact, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 413,
421-426 (1994) (European Union approach falls to provide sufficient equal access to employment opportuni-
ties). See discussion, infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
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against criminal proceedings and to create a system of equivalent effects. The
consequence, in the context of birth mother parental rights termination proceed-
ings is that the general integrity of trial court determinations are treated as
suspect, certainly in contrast to appellate determinations. The cult of the birth
mother, an increasingly powerful force since its origins in pre-Renaissance cults
of the Virgin Mary, 7 has now received the imprimatur of our College of Pon-
tiffs, the justices who are the guardians of our national constitutional cult.'"
In Hendricks, we see the mirror image of M.L.B. Here, the constitutional
principle of fairness permitted a state to adjudge a man a mentally deviant
sexual predator, and on that basis commit him to an indeterminate period of
confinement in state facilities. A majority of the Justices would have us blend
notions of substantive due process, and double jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
limits to arrive at this result.'9 The constitutional principle of fairness permits
what will amount to a heightened scrutiny of any person deemed "dangerously
sexually deviant." In the name of the constitutional principle of fairness, the
Court would have us define and segregate the dangerously deviant for the pur-
pose of curing them of their deviance. It is fair "to protect the public from
harm"' as long as we observe the substantive and procedural niceties.
"[U]nder the appropriate circumstances and when accompanied by the proper
procedures, incapacitation may be a legitimate end of the civil law."'" Thus,
where the Court was willing to indulge the assumption that the state could do
17. On the origins and establishment of the cult of the Virgin Mary, as birth mother of what Christians
believe to be the "Incarnation of the Word which God spoke to the world, the Word which was with God,
which is the Son and the Logos" (1 John 1:1) See MARINA WARNER, ALONE OF ALL HER SEX: THE MYTH
AND THE CULT OF THE VIRGIN MARY (1983).
18. In Pagan Rome, the College of Pontiffs was the most important grouping of priests, which included
all of the highest officials of the religions with which the state was associated. The pontiffs gave instructions
for the proper performance of religious acts, they kept the calendar, and they gave reponsa to queries about
the religious validity of contemplated actions of the state, through the Senate or the magistrates. See ALAN
WATSON, THE STATE, LAW AND RELIGION 5-7 (1992). "The pontiffs did not act in the name of a particular
diety. Rather, they were public officials charged with the duty of keeping good relations between the gods and
the state." Id. at 9. In a sense, the modem Catholic Papacy derives some of its institutional identity from the
antique Roman institution. More tellingly, perhaps, the functions of the College of Pontiffs is currently served
by the Justices of our federal Supreme Court. The analogy becomes apparent when one substitutes the word
"Constitution" for the word "religion" in the description which follows:
One final issue should be noted. From at least the second century B.C. the Roman believed their
greatness was a reward from the gods for their piety, yet it was well known that religion was manip-
ulated-for instance, for political ends. We need not necessarily see cynicism here. What counted for
the maintenance of good relations was the proper performance of the appropriate acts, and the state
of mind of the participant was not relevant.
Id. at 9-10.
19. As Justice Breyer concedes, in dissent,
the basic substantive due process treatment question is whether that Clause requires Kansas to pro-
vide treatment that it concedes is potentially available to a person whom it concedes is treatable. The
same question is at the heart of my discussion of whether Hendricks' confinement violates the
Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause.... For that reason, I shall not consider the substantive due
process treatment question separately, but instead shall simply turn to the Ex Post Facto Clause dis-
cussion.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. CL 2072, 2090 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082. The Kansas statute is one of several which either permit civil confine-
ment of "sexual predators," or require registration of and public access to residence information about such
"sexual predators." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.S. § 14071 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4
(West Supp. 1997).
21. Hendricks, 117 S. CL at 2084 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986)).
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no right by a mother whose child was to be ripped from her bosom, the Court
indulges the opposite presumption in Hendricks.
I first try to make sense of this emerging extra-constitutional doctrine of
fairness, and how it is distinguishable from text-based constitutional doctrine; '
"the problematique is rooted in the interpretative gap which exists between the
constitutional provision and conduct .... ."' I then discuss the way the princi-
ple of fairness molds the outcomes in the two cases.
I. FAmNSs AS A FUNDAMENTAL INTERPRETIVE DOCTRINE
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has established the practice of
fashioning substantially extra-constitutional principles which it then applies to
its interpretation of the "quasi-constitution" of the European Union as "General
Principles of Community Law." Lasok and Bridges usefully describe a differ-
ence between doctrines and principles. The former encompass general prop-
ositions "or guidance relating to a fundamental issue such as eg the nature of
Community law .... ." Principles of law, on the other hand, are rules of con-
duct "prescribed in the given circumstances and carrying a sanction for non-
compliance."' General rules or principles work like doctrine "though they can
be vindicated like any particular rule, they serve a dual purpose: as pointers to
interpretation by the courts and as indication of policy to legislators."'  As
such, "new principles are adopted into the law through judicial decision mak-
ing. ,,28
22. I note here that I am not suggesting that the Court's enterprise of discerning and apply general prin-
ciples of Constitutional law is somehow something like Herbert Weschler's neutral principles. See, Herbert
Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). However, there may
well be a touch of the "structural" Ely in the enterprise, especially in his notion that principles are derivable
principally from the basic law which is the subject of the interpretation, but not with the representation-rein-
forcing notion. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 87-101
(1980). The Constitution does not necessarily have "holes" nor are judges free to transform inclination into
some sort of principle of convenience for purposes of decision. The general principles with which the Court
seems to be concerned in the cases I examine appears to be a conservative sort of thing. It is derived from the
"essence" of the document, as well as a "sense" of the traditions which underlie it.
23. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European
Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European
Communities, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1105 (1986) [hereinafter Weiler, Eurocracy & Distrust].
24. The issues of the origin, use and limitations of the concept, "general principles of Community law"
remain controversial in Europe. I do not discuss those questions here. For a general discussion of the genesis
of principles of Community law, see, for example, LAOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 10, at 179-208; NICHOLAS
EMIuOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONAurY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 115-133 (1996)
[hereinafter EMIuou, THE PRINCIPLE]; JOXERRAMON BENGOEr EA THE LEGAL REASONING OF TnE EUROPE-
AN COURT OF JUSTICE 71-79 (1993) [HEREINAFTER BENGOE xEA, LEGAL REASONING]; and Weiler, Eurocracy
and Distrust, supra note 23.
25. LASOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 10, at 179.
26. Id.
27. Id. On the interpretive and extra-constitutional utility of principles in continental (and especially
European) law, see J. Iguartua, Sobre "Principlos" y "positivismo Legalista," 14 REVISTA VASCA DE LA
ADmINISTRACi6N POBuCA (1986). Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969). Emiliou suggests
four applications of general principles in constitutional interpretation: (i) a guide to the interpretation of pri-
mary law, (ii) a guide to the exercise of power under the primary law, (iii) to provide criteria for determining
the legality of acts, and (iv) to fill in gaps in primary or secondary law to prevent injustice. See EMEIOU, THE
PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 121.
28. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 236-37 (1978). Taking his cue from
(Vol. 33:135
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Of course, the primary sources of European law may appear to provide at
least some small theoretical opening through which the ECJ can justify the
articulation and application of "general principles."29 The ECJ has used this
mechanism to consciously and deliberately articulate and apply a number of
general principles of Community law." These general principles include funda-
mental principles of human rights which have been read into the jurisprudence
of the European Union,3' as well as principles of equality of treatment,32 and
a number of principles derived from continental law?3
The two "procedure" cases from out of this last term highlight the way in
which our Supreme Court, like the European Court of Justice, has incorporated
extra-constitutional doctrines for the purposes of reaching the "right" result
MacCormick, Joxerramon Bengoetxea suggests that general principles, in the form of norms, assume extra-
constitutional dimension:
Political or ethical principles sometimes enter into the legal system disguised as supra-systemic prin-
ciples allegedly referred to or implied by valid norms of the system or by formal interpretive conse-
quences of these. If such principles are incorporated into the legal system, e.g., through court deci-
sion, they might be considered as reasons guiding further decisions, for principles are regarded as
general norms having an explanatory and justificatory force in relation to particular decisions or to
particular rules for decisions.
BENGoErXEA, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 24, at 75 (citing MACCoRMICK, supra note 28, at 260).
29. There is only one reference to "general principles" in the primary law. Article 215(2) of the EC
Treaty provides for EEC liability in non-contractual matters, "in accordance with the general principles com-
mon to the laws of the Member States." EC TREATY art. 215(2). See J. V. LOuiS, THM COMMUNrrY LEGAL
ORDER 68 (1980) (suggesting that this is a specific reference to a term of general applicability). However, the
ECJ may have taken inspiration from other sources. See, e.g., LASOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 10, at 180 (Art.
173 permits the EC to annul an act of the Community which infringes "the Treaty or any-rule of law relating
to its application.").
30. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und
Futtermittel, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, [1972] CMLR 255. The ECJ in Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft rejected
the notion that the validity of Community measures could be judged by applying the fundamental or constitu-
tional rules of any of the Member States. Instead, the ECJ suggested that
[A]n examination should be made as to whether or not any analogous guarantee inherent in Commu-
nity law has been disregarded. In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the
general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst in-
spired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community.
Id.
31. Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, [1974] E.C.R. 491, 508 (ECJ stated that it could draw on interna-
tional instruments as sources for general principles of human rights against which Community law could be
measured.). See Weiler, supra note 23, at 1113-21. Weiler notes that there well be an element of constitution-
al politics at play in the crafting of this general principle of Community law; the incorporation of fundamental
human rights into the Community legal order might be characterized as "an attempt to protect the concept of
supremacy which was threatened because of the inadequate protection of fundamental human rights in the
original Treaty system." Id. at 1119.
32. This principle has been deduced from a small number of provisions in the EC Treaty which pro-
scribe discrimination on the basis of nationality (art. 7), sex (art. 119) and production (art. 40(3)). See EEC
TREATY, supra note 16. It has been applied to great effect in the area of gender equality. Council Directive
751117, art. 119, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19 (the Equal Pay Directive); Council Directive 76/207, 1976 OJ. (L 39)
40 (Equal Treatment Directive). "Perhaps EU law has been as successful as possible in creating equality with-
in a society where men have traditionally dominated the best paying and most rewarding jobs, and have had
more status than women. Women within the EU will now strive to challenge their historical role, knowing
they have the Equal Pay and Equal Treatment Directives behind them in support of their efforts to obtain
more prestigious and better paying jobs." Elena Noel, Prevention of Gender Discrimination Within the Euro-
pean Union, 9 N.Y. INT'L. L. REV. 77, 91-92 (1996). See generally, Ruth A. Harvey, Equal Treatment for
Men and Women in the Work Place: The Implementation of the European Community's Equal Treatment
Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 31 (1990).
33. These include, among others, the principle of proportionality (akin to our constitutional notion of
"least restrictive means"). See, e.g., EmuLoU, TIM PIUNCIPLE, supra note 24.
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where available "black letter" failed to provide a principled means to this result.
In this our Court resembles both the pagan Roman curia,34 and the modem
ECJ.35 The principle doctrine invoked in these cases is that of "fairness." A
subsidiary doctrine is that of "proportionality,"'36 or better put in the language
of American jurisprudence-comparable outcomes. Yet unlike the ECJ, Ameri-
can courts have been loath to admit what they do, perhaps for fear of appearing
to "legislate." '37 In a sense then, this, like many of the decisions of the
Rehnquist Court, is a "Stealth" decision.38
In her majority opinion in M.LB.,39 Justice Ginsburg brilliantly revealed
the way the principle of fairness explodes conventional categories as well as the
way in which she tended to cover her tracks by clumsily folding the application
of that principle within the umbrella of "due process" and "equal protection."
Justice Ginsburg starts her journey with Griffin v. Illinois.' The plurality
opnion in Griffin is literally inapposite, but provides strategic dicta,4' which
"drew support from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses."4 2 It is in-
34. See WATSON, THE STATE, supra note 18, at 85-86.
35. The principle difference, of course, being that the Supreme Court attempts the application of these
general principles sub silentio and within the context of inapplicable and category bursting constitutional
categories. For an interesting comparison of the activism of American and European "federal" courts, see
IJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND PoLIcY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JusTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 7 (1986).
36. While similar to the European conception of this general principle of law, in American law the con-
cept is not applied in the same way. The differences between American and continental notions of proportion-
ality is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of proportionality in continental law, see EMLIOU,
TEE PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 23-114 (proportionality in German and French law),
37. The charge of legislation by judiciary has been effectively used by traditionalists to attempt to damp-
en the aggressiveness with which the American courts have appeared to be interpreting law in a manner in-
consistent with the politics or preferences of the critics. For an effective example of this sort of genre, see
Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Activism: Even on the Right it is Wrong, 95 PUB. INTERFST 57 (1989); Alpheus
Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. REv. 385 (1969); BOPR, supra note 11.
Interestingly enough, and as the decision in Hendricks clearly shows, traditionalists as well as others
continue to "legislate" aggressively on the court. Professor Schwartz has noted that the recent decisions of the
Rehnquist Court have been not only "conservative," "they were also as activist as any decided by the Warren
and Burger Courts." Bernard Schwartz, A Presidential Strikeout, Federalism, RFRA, Standing, and a Stealth
Court, 33 TULSA L. J. (forthcoming 1997).
38. Indeed, Professor Schwartz has questioned rhetorically whether "the Court during the 1996 Term
[can] be characterized as a "Stealth court" because it drastically changed the law without acknowledging that
it had done so." Id.
39. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996).
40. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (mandatory record required for criminal appeals must be provided to indigents
otherwise unable to pay costs to procure it).
41. Thus, from her reading of selected passages from Griffin, Justice Ginsburg begins to draw the defini-
tion of what will ultimately be a description of the "constitutional principle of fairness:" (i) "the State may not
'bolt the door to equal justice;'" M.L.B., 117 S. CL at 560 (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)); (ii) "[to deny adequate review to the poor ... means that many of them may lose their life,
liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts would set aside;" M.L.B., 117 S. CL
at 561 (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19); (iii) "when a State deems it wise and just that convictions be suscep-
tible to review by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which precludes convicted
indigent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted, from securing such a review ...." M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at
561 (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). This dicta, Justice Ginsburg, noted, was
somehow consolidated by that statement of the majority in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), that
"[t]his Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now
fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only
impede open and equal access to courts." Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 310.
42. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 561 (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13, 18). Note that "drawing support from" and
"based on" may be two entirely different things.
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apposite because the case involved a criminal conviction for which incarceration
was a possibility. But Justice Ginsburg then noted that the Griffin result was
extended to criminal cases in which imprisonment was not at stake in Mayer v.
Chicago.' Here again, the dicta points to a fleshing out of the constitutional
principle of fairness." Again, these notions speak to principles springing from
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. However, the majority is forced
to concede, the Clauses themselves are of little help. For the Court has also
clearly held that trial counsel is only available for felony trials' and appeals as
of right;' but does not extend either to non-felony trials where no term of in-
carceration is actually imposed,' or to discretionary appeals.' Thus, for all of
the eloquence of the decisions, they seem to confine the black letter of Due
Process and/or Equal Protection rights of indigents to criminal defendants.
In civil cases, the accepted parameters of the Due Process Clause provides
little additional direct help. Boddie v. Connecticut49 holds that a state may not
deny a couple's right to divorce for inability to pay court fees.s° Yet, in that
case all access to the court was denied in a proceeding in which the state held a
monopoly on the available remedy: divorce. Still, the case provides more mate-
rial for the construction of a constitutional principle of fairness-the notion of a
necessary solicitude for the private life of citizens." Lindsey v. Normet,s2 pro-
vides the majority with evidence that the principles underlying Boddie are gen-
eralizable. More importantly, it appears to move into the realm of the civil law
a principle (of Equal Protection in the context of appeals) heretofore confined to
the line of criminal cases on which the majority had sought support--"[wlhen
an appeal is afforded.... it cannot be granted to some litigants and capri-
ciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection
Clause."' 3 But, of course, the case is also inapposite for the same reason as
Boddie; in both cases, the procedural requirements effectively deprived the
43. See M.L.B., 117 S. CL at 561 ("We declined to limit Griffin to cases in which the defendant faced
incarceration"). Id. (citing Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971)) (indigent defendant convicted of two
nonfelony charges and fined $250 for each offense; state rule providing free transcripts only in felony appeals
overturned).
44. Like more serious criminal offenses, "[p]etty offenses could entail serious collateral consequenc-
es... M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 561.
45. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
46. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
47. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
48. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
49. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
50. See id. at 383.
51. The lesson Justice Ginsburg draws from the case is that
"[gliven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the
concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship. ... [due pro-
cess] prohibit[s] a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to indi-
viduals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages."
M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374). Further, this lesson, Justice Ginsburg tells us, is
confirmed by Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), in which the Court held that the state, in paternity suits,
must pay for blood tests necessary to defend against such suits. See Little, 452 U.S. at 13-17.
52. 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (striking down Oregon law imposing a double-bond on tenants seeking appeal of
adverse eviction decisions).
53. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 561 (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 876).
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indigent litigant of any hearing with respect to a matter over which the courts
held something approaching a monopoly of power to dispense remedies (and in
Lindsey the deprivation affected indigent and non-indigent alike).,4 Moreover,
in following the civil line of Due Process cases, Justice Ginsburg has to con-
front Kras, s and Ortwein."6 The majority would distinguish these cases on
the basis of on acceptance of the Court's conclusion that in both of those cases,
fundamental interests were not at stake. And so, at the end of the recitation of
the cases we are left with very little in the way of black letter Griffin and its
progeny would extend something called either Due Process or Equal Protection
(no one is sure which) to the costs of preparing records for criminal appeals,
but does not apply in the civil context. Boddie and its progeny would appear to
extend something called Due Process to fees for accessing courts which hold a
monopoly on a necessary determination affecting fundamental interests (paterni-
ty or divorce), but is inapplicable to economic and social welfare issues as well
as to discretionary appeals (and even the right to counsel is unavailable as of
right to indigent defendants in discretionary criminal appeals as well). Yet
M.L.B. involved an indigent charged record preparation fees for the purpose of
asserting a discretionary appeal in a case where fundamental interests were
arguably involved. Applying the teaching of Due Process and Equal Protection
would appear to lead to the conclusion that, as unfair as it might seem to one,
the people of Mississippi in their legislature represented, could impose such a
burden on M.L.B.
What to do? One could extend Boddie to cover civil discretionary appeals
in cases involving a fundamental interest. That, effectively, is what Justice
Kennedy, in concurrence, would have had the court hold practically sub silen-
do. Placing the question squarely within the traditional balancing standards of
Mathews v. Eldridge,' Justice Kennedy succinctly concludes:
I acknowledge the authorities do not hold that an appeal is required, even
in a criminal case; but given the existing appellate structure in Missis-
sippi, the realities of the litigation process, and the fundamental interests
at stake in this particular proceeding, the State may not erect a bar in the
form of transcript and filing costs beyond this petitioner's means.58
Had the Court chosen this path, perhaps it would have amounted to an aggres-
sive interpretation of the Due Process Clause. At the very least, it would have
amounted to a significant slap at the power of trial courts to fairly dispose of
cases "on the average." But for all of that, the case would have remained
squarely within the well worn Constitutional interpretive traditions.
54. Only in this manner can we understand the insistence of a discussion of Lindsey when, as Justice
Ginsburg admits, "that the classification there at issue disadvantaged nonindigent as well as indigent appel-
lants ... ; the Lindsey decision, therefore, does not guide our inquiry here." Id. at 562.
55. U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (no constitutional right to have court fees waived for indigents
seeking the protection of the bankruptcy laws).
56. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam) ($25 fee for appellate review of administrative
determination of welfare benefits does not violate Constitution).
57. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
58. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
[Vol. 33:135
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss1/10
19971 APPLYING EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
But Justice Ginsburg, for the majority, attempted something far more ag-
gressive; something extra-constitutional. First, she pulls from Boddie, Lasiter,59
and Santosky,W the notion that parental termination hearings implicate a funda-
mental right.6 Then she uses the dicta in both majority and dissenting opin-
ions of the cases to suggest that determinations which affect fundamental inter-
ests should be subject to a sort of heightened scrutiny; an argument which
implies that when fundamental interests are at stake courts should be more
reluctant to trust the disposition at trial or initial hearing. 2 Next, she elevates
the "comparable worth" analysis of Lassiter to a now generalizable principle
she discerns in Mayer." From this, the majority constructs, from out of the
overtones and expressions of "right" in the cases she outlined, a conclusion that
fairness requires the result she teaches. She notes that Griffin/Mayer involve a
"convergence" of Due Process and Equal Protection "principles." These con-
verging principles "relate to" and "concern" the fundamental legitimacy of
governmental distinctions (in this case based on ability to pay) and the essential
fairness of the governmental scheme. These generalized principles of fundamen-
tal legitimacy and essential fairness are not Due Process or Equal Protection, as
traditionally conceived; something more fundamental is being invoked in the
cases.' That fundamental principle undergirded the contextualized decisions in
the cases Justice Ginsburg described, and ought to undergird a determination of
M.L.B.'s situation as well.
This fundamental schematic stands revealed for all who care to see a prime
59. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (appointed counsel for
indigent persons seeking to defend against state termination of parental rights constitutionally required under
certain circumstances, though not routinely required). Clearly, Lassiter was inapposite. It involved a question
of a constitutional requirement for the appointment of counsel, and it concerned the rights of parties in the
initial action for parental termination. M.L.B. involves the rights of indigents in an appeal from such a deter-
mination.
60. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (imposing a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof in parental termination proceedings). This case is also strictly inapposite-the issue presented to the
Supreme Court did not revolve around the use by Mississippi courts of a standard different from that constitu-
tionally mandated.
61. ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564-565.
62. With respect to Lassiter, Justice Ginsburg states that
[t]he object of the [termination] proceeding is "not simply to infringe upon [the parent's] interest,"
the Court recognized, "but to end it'; thus, a decision against the parent "work[s] a unique kind of
deprivation." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 .... For that reason, "[a] parent's interest in the accuracy and
justice of the decision... is ... a commanding one." Ibid.; see also id., at 39... (Blackmum, J.,
dissenting) ....
M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564-65 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 39).
63. "Parental termination cases, the Lassiter court concluded, are most appropriately ranked with proba-
tion revocation hearings: While the Court declined to recognize an automatic right to appointed counsel, it
said that an appointment would be due when warranted by the character and difficulty of the case." M.L.B.,
117 S. Ct. at 564 (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32).
64. "For the purpose at hand, M.L.B. asks us to treat her parental termination appeal as we have treated
petty offense appeals; she urges us to adhere to the reasoning in Mayer v. Chicago ..... Guided by Lassiter
and Santosky, and other decisions acknowledging the primacy of the parent-child relationship... we agree
that the Mayer decision points to the disposition proper in this case." M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 565-66 (emphasis
added).
65. Id. at 566 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)).
66. "A 'precise rationale' has not been composed [Ross v. Moffit, supra, at 417 U.S. at 609] because
cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.' [Bearden, supra, at
461 U.S. at 666]:' M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566.
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general principle of constitutional law. It is built on the general guidance pro-
vided by a slew of cases, none of which were apposite, all of which implicated
the construction and application of a principle of Constitutional construction
beyond the categories Due Process and Equal Protection. Technically, Justice
Ginsburg builds to a holding based on little more than her willingness to be
"[g]uided by this Court's precedent on an indigent's access to judicial processes
in criminal and civil cases, and on proceedings to terminate parental sta-
tus .... ." Yet she has done substantially more than that. That guidance is the
cover under which she applies a principle which does not exist in the black-
letter norms of the Constitution, but which "designate those norms of a positive
legal order or system that have a fundamental character... [and which] refer to
the 'logical' consequences of groups of norms of a legal system. ' "s Yet Justice
Ginsburg shrinks from an acceptance of the ramifications of this effort. "Never-
theless, '[m]ost decisions in this area,' we have recognized, 'res[t] on an equal
protection framework,' [Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665], as M.L.B.'s plea heavily
does, for, as earlier observed .... due process does not independently require
that the State provide a right to appeal." And so, having effectively sum-
moned and applied a general principle of constitutional law, Justice Ginsburg
scurries back from the ramifications of the deed, decreeing that "[w]e place this
case within the framework established by our past decisions in the area."7 Yet
saying it does not make it so.
Here we have a large forest of trees highlighted in order to hide the forest.
One can only follow the majority's discussion of the cases, criminal and civil,
to what would appear to be the inevitable conclusion that none, standing alone,
permits the result she reaches. Yet at this very point, the majority stops us long
enough to lift us up from among the trees, to show us a forest in which a gen-
eral principle lives. All of the trees (these cases) are of no help when consid-
ered individually. However, taken together, they imply a principle which per-
mits the result she reaches. But this is too much. Such an interpretive enterprise
suggests that extra-constitutional principles can shape law. So, having ascended
to observe the principle, we descend back among the trees. The majority is
reduced to describing her efforts in vaguely applicable "black-letter" constitu-
tional terms. This exercise, as both the concurrence, but especially the dissent
are at pains to point out, is unsatisfying at best and illogical at worst.
In a sense, M.L.B. presented the Court with a problem similar to that faced
by the ECI in Algera7' in which the ECJ was confronted with a situation
67. Id. at 565.
68. BENGOErXEA, supra note 24, at 72 (paraphrasing the categories of the utility of general principles of
law described by J. Iguartua, Sobre "Principios" y "positivismo Legalista," 14 REVISTA VASCA DE LA
ADNIsRAcI6N P-BLICA (1986)).
69. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 565.
70. Id.
71. Joined Cases 7/56 & 3-7/56, Algera v. Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, [1957-58] E.C.R. 39 (Community attempt to withdraw applicability of certain civil service type rules to
a class of employees declared ineffective on basis of a newly articulated principle of "non-existence" or "legal
certainty" or "vested rights" which treats administrative measures as presumptively valid, to be set aside only
[Vol. 33:135
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deemed "unjust" but one for which no remedy was available under the EC
Treaty. In M.L.B., the Court was also confronted with a situation for which
neither statute nor Constitution provided a remedy. In the European case, rather
than "deny justice [the ECJ thought itself] obliged to solve the problem by
reference to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writing and
the case law of the Member States." In the American case, justice was ren-
dered in a similar way.
Indeed, in both cases, the solution lay in recourse to what in Europe is
recognized as a "socially realizable morality." I In Europe, this socially realiz-
able morality is woven into established patterns of jurisprudential analysis so as
to "function as stabilizers of legal development, appealing to the continuity of
existing practice and integrating judicial innovation with recognized legal prac-
tice." '74 The recent ECJ case, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council,7 in which
the ECJ extended the European Union's protection against sex discrimination to
transsexuals, provides a good example of the practice. The ECJ based its deci-
sion not on the particular statute or EC Treaty provision at issue, neither of
which resolved the question before it. Instead, the ECJ based its decision on an
application of the fundamental general principle of equality which both statute
and Treaty "expressed." '76 On that basis, the ECJ read the law broadly to pro-
vide sex discrimination protection for transsexuals.7 In a similar way, the
Court in M.L.B. found that the general notions of essential fairness find expres-
sion in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and that expression re-
quires a broad based reading of the interpretive cases.
Again, understand that what the American Court does is not necessarily
bad, or constitutionally impermissible. The imperatives which drove the ECJ to
craft "general principles" operate with equal force on the American Court. Both
courts are charged with the duty to safeguard the "basic law" of their, respective
jurisdictions. Both have shown a marked disinclination to "deny justice" where
the black-letter law appears silent. However, perhaps because our Court must be
sensitive to challenges to its power to "say what the law is,"' it must make a
greater effort to cloak the jurisprudential basis of its decisions in a language
barely suited to the task. Confusion is inevitable. This situation ought to be
troubling at best, not because what the Court does is wrong, but because the
by means of annulments or withdrawal, to the extent such may be permitted under law).
72. Id. at 55.
73. CLARENCE MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
355 (1972).
74. EMiOU, THE PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 125.
75. Case C-13194, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996). For a discussion of
Cornwall County Council in the European law context, see Larry Catd Backer, Harmonization, Subsidiary and
Cultural Difference: An Essay on the Dynamics of Opposition Within Federative and International Legal
Systems, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 185, 194 (1997).
76. See Cornwall County Council, Case C-13/94, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996).
77. "To tolerate such discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to re-
spect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard." Id.
at 123.
78. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Court's actions are more hidden than they ought to be.
Of course, given the shadow jurisprudence of the majority opinion in
M.L.B., one cannot read the dissent without concluding that Justice Thomas
missed the point entirely. Yes, the points made by the dissent are all arguably
correct and well taken. In the absence of fairness as a general principle of con-
stitutional law, and in a Court unwilling to extend current black-letter interpre-
tation to cover the situation of M.L.B., the dissent has the better arguments.79
But, that, of course, is the problem. One cannot ignore general interpretive
principles and directly meet the real arguments of the majority. This is the
tragedy of the dissent. Justice Thomas devotes much ink to arguing that Griffin
be overruled.' Yet he fails to understand the implications of his discussion of
the anomalies of Justice Ginsburg's gyrations in the majority opinion. Thus, he
suggests that "[tihe Griffin line of cases ascribed to-one might say an-
nounced-an equalizing notion of the Equal Protection Clause that would, I
think, have startled the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers."'" He wonders why
the majority seemingly confuses the fundamental right to maintain the parental
relationship, with any so-called fundamental interest in the right to a civil ap-
peal.' He seeks to overrule Griffin, not merely because it is wrongly decided,
in his opinion, but perhaps more importantly, because it permits the inference
of extra-constitutional principles. These principles are derived, of course, from
an understanding of Constitutional principles, which can then be used to shape
(or distort) black-letter Constitutional interpretation. 3
But what is all this if not discomfort in the face of the use of an extra-
constitutional principle which fits badly within the constraints of settled notions
of Due Process and Equal Protection? Justice Thomas is right that the majority
opinion rests badly within traditional Due Process and Equal Protection dis-
course. But what he doesn't recognize is that it is really not meant to fall within
either. The doctrine underlying the majority opinion is extra-constitutional,
derived from the majority's understanding of implicit norms within Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process sensibilities in our society today. Justice Thomas is
also correct when he asserts that the doctrine announced by the majority will
not be confined to the facts of the case:
In brushing aside the distinction between criminal and civil cases-the
distinction that has constrained Griffin for 40 years-the Court has elimi-
nated the least meaningful limit on the free floating right to appellate
assistance. From Mayer, an unfortunate outlier in the Griffin line, has
79. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 571-575 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 575-78.
81. Id. at 575.
82. Id. at 574 & n.l.
83. Consider in this light the implications of Justice Thomas's analysis of the relationship between the
decisions in Mayer, Scott, and Lassiter
The assertion that civil litigants have no right to the free transcripts that all criminal defendants enjoy
is difficult to sustain in the face of our holding that some civil litigants are entitled to the assistance
of counsel to which some criminal defendants are not. It is at this unsettled (and unsettling) place that
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sprung the M.L.B. line, and I have no confidence that the majority's assur-
ances that the line starts and ends with this case will hold true."
Yet, Justice Thomas fails to recognize that the reason that M.L.B. will not be
contained is not because the case is aberrational, but rather because it represents
a concrete application of the extra-constitutional principles of fairness (legitima-
cy and essential fairness). As such, Justice Thomas is right to note (but for the
wrong reasons) that under the general principle "announced today, I do not see
how a civil litigant could constitutionally be denied a free transcript in any case
that involves an interest that is arguably as important as the interest in
Mayer." I agree.
Ironically, in Hendricks, it is Justice Thomas who takes up the banner of
decision by application of extra-constitutional principles clothed in the language
of black-letter constitutionalism. Justice Thomas continues to apply that hoary
old principle of constitutional law, which reads into every rule of process a
substantive limitation to the freedom given states in the black letter of the four-
teenth amendment to deprive every individual of life, liberty or property after
complying with the requisites of due process of law. While we continue to
argue about the parameters of that substantive limitation," every Justice writ-
ing in Hendricks agreed that there are substantive limitations on the power of a
state to deprive a person of her liberty; that is, there exist classes of depriva-
tions of liberty with respect to which no amount of procedural due process
could permit."
While most commentators have treated the rise and transformation of sub-
stantive due process as an aspect of mainstream constitutional interpretation, I
maintain that the creation and maintenance of "substantive" limitations on the
power of a state to deprive citizens of life, liberty or property is among the
oldest of the extra-constitutional general principles of constitutional law. The
Fourteenth Amendment provision speaks positively about the power of the state
to deprive any person of life, liberty or property, once the requisite minimum
formalities have been observed. It might be possible to argue that the provision
permits variance in the minimum process necessary, depending on the impor-
tance of the deprivation; and we have built a huge jurisprudence on this notion.
It requires resort to extra-constitutional principles of limitations of state power
to derive from the Due Process Clause a notion that certain classes of depriva-
84. Id. at 577-78.
85. Id. at 577.
86. Until the 1930s, the Court applied the principle of substantive limitations of constitutionally sanc-
tioned powers to effect deprivations primarily to curtail severely the economic enactments of the state. See,
e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). After the 1930s, the force of substantive limitations on the
power of states to effect deprivations shifted, along with some of the Court's Constitutional jurisprudence, to
issues of personal autonomy. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For a discus-
sion of the shift in the focus of this most restrictive application of the "substantive" limitation on state power
to effect deprivations, see BORK, supra note 11, at 36-49, 110-126.
87. All members of the Court continue to stand by the decision in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1992) (civil commitment of mentally ill and dangerous persons does not come within that class of depriva-
tions of liberty that even the fourteenth amendment cannot permit).
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tion may never (or hardly ever) be effected by the state irrespective of the
amount of procedural due process provided. Not tied strictly to black letter, yet
couched in the language of ordinary constitutional construction, the principle
has had an interesting and wholly unsatisfactory life. Again, don't misunder-
stand, the fact that the Court has had to construct a general principle of consti-
tutional law to read a substantive limitation into the procedural due process
scheme of the Fourteenth Amendment does not make it wrong. It merely sug-
gests another example of a perhaps necessary subterfuge which riddles Ameri-
can approaches to Constitutional interpretation.88
Ironically, Justice Thomas' "substantive" due process/double jeopardy/Ex
Post Facto constitutionalism in Hendricks appears in some respects as no more
than an expansive application of that very extra-constitutional fairness principle
he so resolutely fails to see or continence in M.L.B. This has nothing to do with
the "substantive" due process issues underlying the affirmance by the Court of
the power of the state to deprive a person of her liberty through carefully cir-
cumscribed civil commitment proceedings. No one on this Court questions the
notion that the power of states to deprive persons of life, liberty or property
without due process of law is not unlimited.
Instead, the fairness principle of constitutional law is most evident in the
great disagreement between the majority and the dissent regarding the "puni-
tive" nature of Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act. Here categorical consti-
tutional analysis fails us.89 And rightly so. While the implications of
"punitiveness" can effect the implementation of the black-letter of Due Process,
and in this case, Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy protections, "punitiveness"
itself is necessarily a creature of something else, something extra-constitutional.
Here I mean extra-constitutional in the sense that the Court must search outside
the four comers of the Constitution for those norms, those principle, on which
such a determination is based. For purposes of that determination in this case,
the principles of essential fairness and of legitimacy of purpose, so plainly
revealed in M.L.B., guide the determination.
Determinations of "punitiveness" cannot be contained within traditional
doctrinal analysis. Instead, both Justice Thomas's majority opinion and Justice
Breyer's dissent struggle to mold the principles they employ within the tradi-
tional and limited discourse of Due Process and Ex Post Facto/Double Jeopar-
88. A more detailed discussion of this general principle of constitutional law lies outside the scope of
this piece. See, e.g., John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REv. 493
(1997) (attempting to "marry" Constitutional text to the doctrine of substantive due process).
89. The "basic substantive due process treatment question" of whether Kansas is required "to provide
treatment that it concedes is potentially available to a person whom it concedes is treatable... is at the heart
of [the] discussion of whether Hendrick's confinement violates the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause."
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Notwithstanding its civil attributes, the practical effect of the Kansas law may be to impose confine-
ment for life .... The concern... is whether it is the criminal system or the civil system which
should make the decision in the fist place. If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment
after the State makes an improvident pleas bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its
proper function. These concerns persist whether the civil confinement statute is put on the books
before or after the offense.
ILd. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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dy. Justice Thomas would employ the language of statutory construction to pro-
nounce the provision "non-punitive."9° The statute could neither be retribu-
tive,9 nor could the Act be intended to function as a deterrent.' 2 As such, the
only aspect of the provision which resembled a "punitive" statute at all was its
"result"--affirmative restraint. But that is no problem at all under our law, "the
mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion
that the government has imposed punishment."
Why does this work? Why does this seem fairly mundane? After all, when
the instrumentalities of the state were deployed against M.L.B., all of the Justic-
es were sensitive to her plight and the fundamental nature of her connection to
her child. Should not we be as concerned for the liberty of Mr. Hendricks? But
no one is particularly concerned. "A common response to this may be, 'A life
term is exactly what the sentence should have been anyway,' or, in the words
of a Kansas task force member, 'So be it."'94 Mr. Hendricks is a monster-a
confirmed "lifetime" child molester. 5 He is dangerous.' The availability of
treatment, or the lack of it, on the one hand, or the decision to withhold treat-
ment until post sentence confinement is available, on the other hand, makes no
difference.
Accepting the Kansas court's apparent determination that treatment is not
possible for this category of individuals does not obligate us to adopt its
legal conclusions. We have already observed that, under the appropriate
circumstances and when accompanied by proper procedures, incapacitation
90. "Nothing on the face of the statute suggests that the legislature sought to create anything other than
a civil commitment scheme designed to protect the public from harm." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
91. Thus, Justice Thomas could discern no retributive purpose in the legislatiori; "the fact that the Act
may be 'tied to criminal activity' is 'insufficient to render the statut[e] punitive' United States v. Ursery ....
116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 ... (1996)." Id. at 2082.
92. "Those persons committed under the Act are, by definition .... [unable to] exercisfe] adequate con-
trol over their behavior. Such persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement" Id.
at 2082. For a discussion of the notion of deterrence in the context of "uncontrollable" tendencies to sexual
action, see RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 211-213 (1992).
93. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct at 2083 (quoting U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
94. Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Testimony of Jim Blaufuss, App. 503).
95. Justice Thomas brilliantly marshaled the full palette of cultural language with which our society has
judged people with the habits of Mr. Hendricks as being beyond disgust. For a discussion of the effectiveness
of the language of pedophilia as a means of condemnation, see Larry Cats Backer, Constructing a "Homosex-
ual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and British
Courts, 71 TuL L. REV. 529, 572-78 (1996).
Thus, Justice Thomas went to some lengths to detail Mr. Hendrick's thirty (30) year personal odyssey
of sexually molesting children. This was a man who satisfied his insatiable lust on all children-male or
female, it didn't make a difference; it was the youth of the victim which made all the difference in the world.
He began by exposing himself to girls in 1955 (indecent exposure), progressing soon thereafter to lewdness
with a girl (1957). He turned to boys in 1960 in an "every parent's nightmare" scenario-molesting two
young boys while he worked at a carnival (all sorts of cultural stereotypes are present in this description).
Thereafter, he molested a 7 year old girl, received treatment and was pronounced "safe to be at large" in
1965; only to perform oral sex on an 8 year old girl and fondle an 11 year old boy soon thereafter. He spent
the years 1967 to 72 in prison, when he was paroled, abandoned a treatment program and began abusing his
stepson and step daughter, an activity which persisted for 4 years. He was arrested for attempting to take
indecent liberties with two 13 year old boys in 1984 and found himself in prison; at that time, he became the
first person against whom the Kansas violent sexual predator act was used. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct at 2079.
96. "Kansas does not intend an individual committed pursuant to the Act to remain confined any longer
than he suffers from a mental abnormality rendering him unable to control his dangerousness." Hendricks, 117
S. Ct at 2083.
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may be a legitimate end of the civil law.... A State could hardly be seen
as furthering a "punitive" purpose by involuntarily confining persons
afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious disease.... Similarly, it
would be of little value to require treatment as a precondition for civil
confinement of the dangerously insane when no acceptable treatment
existed. To conclude otherwise would obligate a state to release certain
confined individuals who were both mentally ill and dangerous simply
because they could not be successfully treated for their afflictions.'
Here we see the "comparable worth" approach at the core of any application of
principles of essential fairness, and so transparently applied in M.L.B. In
ML.B., certain criminal proceedings were deemed functionally equivalent to
parental termination determinations, and fairness required the same or equiva-
lent result. In Hendricks, "untreatable, highly contagious disease" is deemed the
functional equivalent of pedophilia. Fairness here requires a no less equivalent
result. Combined with the focus on the potential victims of the uncontrollable
danger emanating from Mr. Hendricks the monster, the meaning of "punitive"
as a matter of constitutional law "naturally" follows. But that meaning does not
follow from the application of Constitutional black letter. Instead, Constitutional
interpretation is possible only through the application of a principle of "essential
fairness" as conceived by the traditionalist majority in Hendricks. The black
letter is of no help here. The Double Jeopardy Clause cannot be used to prevent
the civil commitment.98 For the same reasons, the Ex Post Facto laws do not
prevent Mr. Hendrick's loss of liberty; "the Act does not impose punishment;
thus its application does not raise ex post facto concerns.""
Thus, the general principle of fairness comes to play in this case not for
Mr. Hendricks, but rather fairness is arrayed against the man who is to be con-
fined, and in favor of, well, everyone else in the state. That it is Mr. Hendricks'
liberty interest which is at stake, that he will face a potential life sentence for
the admitted propensity to commit crimes in the future as yet uncommitted,
makes no difference. The general principle of fairness directs our attention to
the population which needs protection from the deviant proclivities of this sick
man. For the majority, the principle of fairness helps direct our attention to the
deprivation interests of the general population, and especially its children. Mr.
Hendrick's depravity deprives his interest in liberty of substantial value.'"
Justice Kennedy concurs. "The point, however, is not how long Hendricks
and others like him should serve a criminal sentence. With his criminal record,
after all, a life term may well have been the only sentence appropriate to protect
97. Id. at 2084.
98. See id. at 2086.
99. Id.
100. What has been said of the European Court of Justice applies with the equal force in Hendrick.
The European Court must be and has been shrewdly sensitive to national reaction to the digestibility
of its rulings. If the Court is considering whether to deliver a ruling that it foresees may be rejected
at a national level, it must weigh up Whether it can justify running the risk of non-compliance and the
consequent loss of credibility for itself and, perhaps, for the Community as a whole.
STEnEN w&-ATHmuu, LAw AND DmGRAnoN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 218 (1995).
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society and vindicate the wrong.''. Moreover, "[i]n this case, the mental ab-
normality-pedophilia-is at least described in the DSM-IV. ' 'I °2 In none of
this can Justice Kennedy find that the civil commitment, in this case, was "a
mechanism for retribution or general deterrence" anathema to the prece-
dents."
However much he agrees with the disposition of the liberty of this mon-
ster, he remains generally suspicious of the utility of this tool of civil commit-
ment the Court appears to give the states under the mantle of a dispensation
from the limitations of the "substance" of Due Process. He writes only to
warn.' The warning arises from the fear that the results of this case might be
generalizable to people who might be deviants, certainly, and perhaps danger-
ous, theoretically, but not the sort of monster for which such confinement stat-
utes ought to be limited. Sham or pretextual treatment, or attempts to rectify
improvident plea bargains, in the form of civil confinement statutes would shift
the balance of fairness to the person who was to be deprived of his liberty. Nor
is tle state free to indulge in the creation of definitions of "mental abnormality"
as a category "too imprecise... to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil
detention is justified ... .""
But Justice Kennedy's concerns are precisely the problem for the dissent.
The defendant may be revolting, but by complying with the formalities of tradi-
tional Constitutional black-letter jurisprudence, Kansas is attempting to use the
permissiveness of "substantive" due process to trump the limitations of the Ex
Post Facto doctrine. Justice Breyer, in dissent, deliberately conflates notions of
substantive due process and the Ex Post Facto doctrines to create another item-
tion of the principle of fairness. He then applies this principle to quibble, not
with the understanding of the use of principle of fairness, but rather with its
application in this case. We do not like sex predators, but in this case the state
is as out of control as it claims Mr. Hendricks has been for most of his life. In
such cases, essential fairness requires the state to give way to the interests of
the individual. Much of the dissent is taken up by an attempt to show precisely
the sham or pretext in the creation of the confinement which Justice Kennedy
suggested would trouble him. 6
Thus the practical experience of other States, as revealed by their statutes,
confirms what the Kansas Supreme Court's finding, the timing of the civil
commitment proceeding, and the failure to consider less restrictive altema-
tives, themselves suggest, namely, that for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes,
101. Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. "My brief, further comment is to caution against dangers inherent when a civil confinement law is
used in conjunction with the criminal process, whether or not the law is given retroactive application" Id.
105. Id.
106. "[When a State believes that treatment does exist, and then couples that admission with a legisla-
tively required delay of such treatment until a person is at the end of his jail term (so that further incapacita-
tion is therefore necessary), such a legislative scheme begins to look punitive." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2091-
92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the purpose of the Kansas Act (as applied to previously convicted offend-
ers) has a punitive, rather than a purely civil, purpose."
But, given the nature and effect of this civil confinement statute, the objections
are a quibble. For Justice Breyer, legitimacy and fairness principles are not
offended by a determination to use the civil statutes to deprive people adjudged
by the state to be "dangerous" and "mentally ill" of their liberty for the purpose
of treating them. Moreover, essential fairness to the general population would
also prevent the use of "substantive" Due Process, Ex Post Facto or Double
Jeopardy Clauses to prevent the confinement of "dangerous, mentally ill and
untreatable" people, provided the minimum procedural niceties are observed,
whether such confinement is imposed prospectively or retroactively." 8 The
real problem here is that, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the state
appears to be a bigger monster than Mr. Hendricks. Essential fairness "in these
circumstances does not stand as an obstacle to achieving important protections
for the public's safety; rather it provides an assurance that, where so significant
a restriction of an individual's basic freedoms is at issue, a State cannot cut cor-
ners."' "°o As such, the State "must hew to the Constitution's liberty-protecting
line.""0 That line is neither inherent in the limitations of Due Process, or Ex
Post Facto, but flows from the interpretive potential of the general principle of
essential fairness. This "essential fairness" to Hendricks, to the state of Kansas
and its population, empowers the court to read into the black letter of Due
Process, substantive limitations which it does not contain, in order to permit
confinement to be counted as a civil penalty. Yet, in doing so, Justice Thomas
also uses the principle to reserve to the court the power, on the basis of an
equivalence analysis, to treat the civil penalty as criminal.
The Courts have insisted on cramming the analysis flowing from the appli-
cation of general principles of constitutional law into conflated notions of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in M.L.B., and the Due Process and
Ex Post Facto Clauses in Hendricks. This practice has tended to distort Consti-
tutional analysis, making it practically inscrutable from time to time. Indeed,
disentangling technical constitutionalism from the principles which the Courts
may necessarily have to apply to breathe life into the document may well be a
valuable exercise.
107. Id. at 2095.
108. Id. at 2096.
To find a violation of [the Ex Post Facto] Clause here, however, is not to hold that the Clause pre-
vents Kansas* or other States, from enacting dangerous sexual offender statutes. A statute that oper-
ates prospectively, for example, does not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause .... Neither does it of-
fend the Ex Post Facto Clause for a State to sentence offenders to the fully authorized sentence, to
seek consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences, or to invoke recidivism statutes to lengthen im-
prisonment. Moreover, a statute that operates retroactively, like Kansas' statute, nevertheless does not
offend the Clause if the confinement that it imposes is not punishment ....
Id. at 2098.
109. Id.
110. Id. The dissent makes clear that it smelled a rat in the actions of the State, which "decides offenders
can be treated and confines an offender to provide that treatment, but then refuses to provide it, [that] refusal
to treat while the person is fully incapacitated begins to look punitive." Id. at 2096.
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We now understand how the Court deploys general principles of constitu-
tional law sub silentio even as it attempts to use the language of black-letter
discourse. The general principle of fairness or "essential fairness" has been
deployed this term to reach two seemingly inconsistent conclusions. In M.L.B.,
the principle was used to overcome the limitations of Due Process and Equal
Protection to require that indigent mothers be provided the record needed for a
discretionary appeal. In Hendricks, the same court used the principle to over-
come the limitations of Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy to confirm a state's
power to confine people they deem medically deviant and dangerous.
Yet the results are not inconsistent. Rather, this Term's cases demonstrate
that the Court has been able to deploy the general constitutional principle of
essential fairness to create its own hierarchy of interests. In paramount position
is a mother's interest in her birth children. With respect to that interest essential
fairness appears to mandate an extremely high sensitivity to erroneous depriva-
tion. This Term seems to confirm what we have long suspected, a state's inter-
est in the health and safety of its citizens, in general, appears to be accorded a
high position. Especially where the state's interest is in the protection of its
children, essential fairness appears to permit a high sensitivity to potential de-
privations of safety (read as a liberty interest). The interest of people labeled as
dangerous social deviants is of relatively small importance. Essential fairness
permits, and perhaps requires, a low sensitivity to erroneous deprivations of the
liberty of people.
This hierarchy has several ramifications I wish to explore briefly. The first
is that enhanced solicitude for the interests of mothers in their birth children (or
in their children generally) necessarily appears to result in a substantially lower
solicitude for the integrity of lower court decisions. With respect to interests
that matter, the Supreme Court now tells us that we should not place substantial
trust in lower courts to reach the correct result. The second is'that where a state
appears to define a condition of deviance as amounting to a mental illness of
some sort and can reasonably couple it with dangerousness (i.e., an individual's
inability or unwillingness to control her deviance), then that individual's interest
in her liberty can be accorded substantially less weight than the interest of
society in being free of the dangerous condition. As Justice Kennedy suggests,
if unchecked, the possibilities of this notion can be quite breathtaking.
Justice Ginsburg did an exceptional job of suggesting that state lower
courts which deal with parental rights termination cases, or at least the lower
courts of Mississippi which deal with those issues, are not reliably competent.
The Mississippi Chancery Court did not bother to elaborate on its reasons for
concluding that the natural father and his new wife had meet their heavy burden
of proof. "Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence, however,
or otherwise reveals precisely why M.L.B. was decreed, forevermore, a stranger
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to her children.' Justice Ginsburg quotes M.L.B.'s brief for statistics on the
"efficacy of appellate review in parental status termination cases [to the effect]
that of the eight reported appellate challenges to Mississippi trial court termina-
tion orders from 1980 through May 1996, three were reversed by the Mississip-
pi Supreme Court for failure to meet the [statutory] standard.""' 2 For the
M.L.B. majority, this constitutes an unacceptable risk of error given the impor-
tance of M.L.B.'s interest in her natural children."' When lower courts deal
with a "stem judgment" such as this, then "[o]nly a transcript can reveal to
judicial minds other than the Chancellor's the sufficiency, or insufficiency, of
the evidence .... ." 4 As against this, the M.L.B. majority arrays merely the
State's interest in saving a couple of thousand dollars per case in situations
where it is unlikely that many cases will require such expenditure."5 This in-
terest the M.L.B. majority dismisses as almost irrelevant. Justice Ginsburg's
majority could not be clearer that in matters affecting fundamental rights, lower
court determinations are at best contingent, subject to the now almost necessary
confirmation by the appellate courts.
But consider the implications of this balancing on the integrity of lower
court determinations. The M.L.B. majority seems to imply that because the
Chancery Court of Mississippi was reversed in some number of its rulings, the
rulings reversed were necessarily wrong. Worse, they might have been wrong
because they were sloppy-heedless of the good manners of providing the
necessary fodder for the appellate courts. This is especially disturbing with
respect to cases touching on relationships such as that between mother and
child. But appellate courts are as fallible as the courts which they reverse." 6
Indeed, it is the height of illogic to insist that the State of Mississippi need not
grant appeals from parental termination proceedings, and then argue strongly
that the appellate rights of the indigent should be eased in some large part be-
cause of the high reversal rate of such determinations in the appellate courts of
111. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560. Quoting the language of the statute, the Chancellor determined that there
had been a substantial erosion of the relationship between M.L.B. and her natural children. As to the cause of
this deterioration, the Chancellor quoted, without elaboration, the statutory grounds for parental rights termina-
tion under these circumstances. See id. at 559.
112. Id. at 560 & n.3. Justice Ginsberg also noted, from M.L.B.'s brief, that the reversal rate at the appel-
late level was almost 39%, and the reversal rate at the state supreme court was nearly 37%. Id.
113. "And the risk of error, Mississippi's experience shows, is considerable." Id. at 566. Worse, the Chan-
cellor fudged, not even bothering to create the sort of record which federal judges are now trained to deliver
up to the appellate courts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. "[Ihe Chancellor's termination order in
this case simply recites statutory language; it describes no evidence or otherwise details no reasons for [its]
finding" that M.L.B. was unfit Id.
114. Id.
115. "Mississippi's experience with criminal appeals is noteworthy in this regard. In 1995, the Mississippi
Court of Appeals disposed of 298 first appeals from criminal convictions .... of those appeals, only seven
were appeals from misdemeanor convictions .... notwithstanding our holding in Mayer .... I"d. at 567.
116. Consider Justice Jackson's famous suggestion that "[there is no doubt that if there were a super-
Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). For a discussion of the way in which our system balances between
discouraging and encouraging appeals through the construction of rules of appellate procedure, see, Larry Cati
Backer, Civil Wars: Stays of Execution, Appellate Sanctions and the Nature of Consensus on the Utility of
Appellate Review, 29 TULSA L. J. 65, 146-157 (1993).
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Mississippi. But Justice Ginsburg might not have meant what she said-indeed
in some future case the Court will find that in matters of fundamental rights,
appellate review may be constitutionally mandated (perhaps only in those cases
where high reversal rates indicate some substantial showing of erroneous depri-
vation). On the other hand, if she did mean what she said, then the fact of the
high reversal rate should have added little to the constitutional argument. Ulti-
mately, the only sentiment that emerges loud and clear is that lower court deter-
minations should not be trusted. This may well be a dangerous sentiment in-
deed. A system in which the Justices of the Supreme Court suggest weakness in
the lower courts is one which might well encourage disrespect and disregard for
such determinations."7
The relationship between the power to defite deviance and dangerousness,
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the related power to confine people,
under either the criminal or civil law, or both, who meet these definitions, pro-
vide another point of interest. We are all well aware of the long saga of the
construction of sexual deviances of a number of different stripes as medical and
even psychiatric (uncontrollable) illnesses, and the subsequent rehabilitation of a
number of those "conditions," in medicine if not in morals. Masturbation,"'
sodomy,"9 and others have each, in turn, provided grist for the mill of the
criminal law, as well as fodder for civil commitment.
We are also well aware of the cynical uses to which other less democratic
nations have used psychiatry as a means of controlling dissidence, by defining
it (conveniently) as dangerous, anti-social activity. The former Soviet Union
provides a singular example of this practice, though we in this country have not
historically been immune from the practice.
It is with this in mind that Justice Thomas' paean to the State of Kansas
and its civil commitment scheme is so striking. Justice Thomas would clearly
have us continue to applaud the power of the state to remove dangerous devi-
ants from civil society.Y That power is based on the principle that the inter-
ests of society as a whole exceeds that of an individual in her liberty, where
that individual threatens the safety of other members of society. But what stan-
dards does the majority offer for the balancing to be effected between the safety
of the whole and the deviance of the individual. Justice Thomas, in his rush to
ensure that Mr. Hendricks trouble the children of Kansas no more, appears to
117. Harlan Leigh Dalton has written on the negative consequences of a system which emphasizes the
"rectitude" of appeals and which encourages the questioning of decisions of the lower courts. See Harlon
Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE LJ. 62 (1985).
118. On Western pseudo-scientific paranoia about masturbation as a socially dangerous activity, see,
Lesley A. Hall, Forbidden by God, Despised by Men: Masturbation, Medical Warnings, Moral Panic and
Manhood in Great Britain, 1850-1950, in FORBIDDEN HISTORY: THE STATE, SOCIETY AND THE REGULATION
oF SE XALrrY IN MODERN EuROPE 293 (John C. Fout ed., 1992); LAwREN CE STONE, TiE FAMILY, SEX AND
MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 677 (1977).
119. On the evolution of American state court attitudes about and rationales for continuing to enforce
statutes proscribing sodomy, see, Larry CatA Backer, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale
About the Transformation of Modern Sodomy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. CRIm. L. 37 (1993).
120. "It thus, cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous
persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty." Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2080.
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give states a substantial amount of leeway in defining the conditions under
which the weighing of interests will tilt heavily against the liberty interest of
the individual. Thus, states are not required "to adopt any particular nomencla-
ture in drafting civil commitment statutes,'' nor need the state even track ac-
cepted medical definitions when attempting a political definition of illness.1'
But Justice Thomas would invite even more expansiveness than that:
We recognize, of course, that psychiatric professionals are not in complete
harmony in casting pedophilia... as "mental illness]."... These dis-
agreements, however, do not tie the State's hands in setting the bounds of
its civil commitment laws. In fact, it is precisely where such disagreement
exists that legislatures have been afforded the widest latitude in drafting
such statutes."
The dissent, on the other hand, would limit the availability of legislative free-
dom where professionals disagree. 4 Under either version, when some quan-
tum of some portion of the medical professions defines some condition as ab-
normal, and the condition describes conduct which cannot be controlled, and it
threatens the safety of the public, then the state may confine the individual until
"cured." Hendricks and the cases cited in that case are relatively easy. But they
are easy only because we continue to be revolted, as a society, by adults who
would attempt sexual conduct with children. Yet just 40 years ago most of our
society exhibited the same sort of revulsion with respect to adults of the same
sex who engaged in sexual activity with each other."n
Yet the fact that we as a society might be revolted by some action does
not necessarily mean that it amounts to a mental disorder. On that theory, every
criminal act, every violent anti-social activity punished by the criminal law,
could conceivably also describe the symptoms of some mental abnormality
equivalent to mental illness of some sort. Moreover, that our society ought to
have the power to punish certain conduct (the limits of which I do not discuss
here), does not necessarily also mean that the society ought to attempt to treat
121. Id. at 2081.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2081 n3. The ECJ has taken a similar approach. See, e.g., Case 174/82, Criminal Proceedings
Against Sandoz BV, (1983] E.C.R. 2445 (1949 Dutch law prohibiting additions of vitamins to food does not
violate EU law). The Court noted:
i[n] so far as there are uncertainties at the present state of scientific research it is for the Member
States, in the absence of harmonization, to decide what degree of protection of the health and life of
humans they intend to assure, having regard however for the requirements of the free movement of
goods within the Community.
Id. See also, Case 54/85, Minsitere Public v. Mirepoix, [1986] E.C.R. 1067 (upholding ban on imported on-
ions with pesticide reside but requiring periodic review of scientific information available).
124. "The Constitution permits a State to follow one reasonable professional view, while rejecting anoth-
er .... The psychiatric debate, therefore, helps to inform the law by setting the bounds of what is reasonable,
but it cannot here decide just how States must write their laws within those bounds." Hendricks, 117 S. CL at
2088 (Breyer, L, dissenting).
125. The sexual psychopath laws of a generation ago, several of which were the object of the cases relied
on in Hendricks, were far more expansive in their definition of the illnesses for which commitment was war-
ranted than the modem variants. In Nebraska, people posing a danger to society included adults found to have
engaged in consensual homosexual activity. See Domenico Caporale & Deryl F. Hamann, Comment: Sexual
Psychopathy -A Legal Labyrinth of Medicine, Morals and Mythology, 36 NEB. L. REv. 320, 325 (1957).
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the crime as illness. This we understood fairly long ago:
There is a tendency, noticeably increasing in strength over recent years, to
label homosexuality a "disease" or "illness." This may be no more than a
particular manifestation of a general tendency discemable in modem soci-
ety by which, as one leading sociologist puts it, "the concept of illness
expands continually at the expense of moral failure."'"
Perhaps Hendricks is evidence that we have no choice in this society. If we
eliminate immorality as a basis for criminalization or social control, then an
easy and permissible alternative is to convert moral failure into medical devi-
ance. The trick, of course, is to characterize that deviance as "dangerous."
Criminal activity, of course, can be evidence of inherent danger, if not directly,
then indirectly."n Conduct involving minors or the incapacitated also qualify.
But with the expansive power of incapacitation Justice Thomas seems to
approve, the state appears to have a tremendous power. It has the power to
confine individuals under its criminal and civil laws. Moreover, it has the power
to define those actions with respect to which it can then assert the power to
commit an individual under the civil law. Deviance and dangerousness suffi-
cient to warrant civil commitment are legal, not necessarily medical terms,In
especially where at least some arguably qualified group of medical practitioners.
support the definitions used. Justice Thomas and the Hendricks majority,
though, would seem to go further not only does the state have substantial pow-
er with respect to those two critical aspects of incapacitation, but having de-
fined deviance and dangerousness in the form of some identifiable condition
over which the person has substantially no control, and having labeled that
condition dangerous, the state will be entitled to a large degree of deference.
This will be especially the case where the conduct subject to incapacitation
elicits some substantial revulsion among the general population. In many cases
the "result" will appear "right," but the danger of medicalizing social deviance
is substantial, and the power given to the state to limit the liberty of those sub-
ject to that condition can be great, and, in retrospect, "wrong.'' 29
Justice Kennedy may have had the right of it, though he did not grasp its
126. COMM='EE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSE AND PROSTIT ON, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 30 (Autho-
rized Am. ed., Stein & Day 1963) (1957) (quoting in part Barbara Wooton, Sickness or Sin, in THE TwEn-
ETH CENTuRY (1956)).
127. This is possible because it might lead to violence in its commission or in the prevention of discovery
of the crime.
128. "Rather, we have traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that
have legal significance." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
129. The implications extend well beyond the area of civil commitment. Thus, for example, consider the
power of the state to compel poor women to attend school, or live with their parents, on pain of losing their
welfare benefits, or custody of their children. See, for example, MIm ABRAMOVrrz, REGULATnNG TIE LIVES
OF wOMEN: SociAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIM TO THE PRESENT (1988) (on the repeated
efforts to extract penalties from women for socio-cultural deviance). Consider, alternatively, proposals permit-
ting the state to convert certain classes of the poor into permanent "wards" of the state, and subject to their
control where the evidence is strong that they are incapable of "controlling" or "changing" their socially and
economically "deviant" behavior. See Nell Gilbert, Welfare Reform: Implications and Alternatives, 7
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 323 (1996) (discussion of a form of such a plan). Yet, there is no reason that the
ideas expressed in Hendricks cannot have application in those situations.
1997]
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full implications: "We should bear in mind that while incapacitation is a goal
common to both the criminal and civil systems of confinement, retribution and
general deterrence are reserved for the criminal system alone."'"0 Ironically,
the criticism so lavishly bestowed by the traditionalist judges on Roe v.
Wade.' and its "medically approved" notion of autonomy, comes back to
haunt those very judges in this case.' It seems to me that Justice Thomas is
no less guilty of "medically approved" constitutionalism in Hendricks, than
Justice Blackmun was in Roe.
III. CONCLUSION
This Term the Court did something more than articulate new directions for
Due Process Clause jurisprudence. That something was to articulate, with far
greater precision and transparency, an enterprise with which the Supreme Court
has been engaged for a time: the determination of Constitutional cases through
the application of internally crafted "general principles of Constitutional law."
In M.L.B. and Hendricks, the Court applied the far more realistic yet imprecise
extra-constitutional category-legitimacy or essential fairness-to overcome the
limitations inherent in the black letter of the Due Process, Equal Protection, Ex
Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal Constitution. Fairness
requires none of these categories. Indeed, as the opinions in the two cases make
quite clear, fairness explodes those categories when the Court attempts to cram
this general principle of Constitutional law into these black-letter categories.
The Court, though, retains the language of these categories to obfuscate both
the reality and application of these extra-constitutional principles. Perhaps this
is done out of habit; perhaps it is a requisite of the political games by which we
play at constitutionalism."
130. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
132. As then Judge Ginsberg tellingly explained in 1984:
Justice O'Connor, ten years after Roe, described the trimester approach as "on a collision course with
itself." [City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2507 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)]. Advances in medical technology would continue to move forward the
point at which regulation could be justified as protective of a woman's health, and move backward
the point of viability, when the state could proscribe abortions unnecessary to preserve the patient's
life or health. The approach, she thought... called upon courts to examine legislative judgments ...
as "science review boards." [Id.]
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375, 381 (1985).
133. In describing the ways in which the European Court of Justice approached similar interpretive prob-
lem, Joseph Weiler suggested that general principles are the necessary response to problems created by the
"inevitable gap conditioned inter alia by the nature of constitutional language (and of language in general),
the passage of time between drafting and interpretation, and, perhaps, even the inherent indeterminant nature
of law. It is rendered acute by social, ideological, and economic differentiation of society." Weiler, supra note
23, at 1103-04. He further suggests that in societies with greater social and cultural cohesion, this interpretive
process will appear less visible. See id. at 1104 n.4. Where cultural conflict becomes more important, for
instance in late twentieth century America, such processes inevitably become not only more visible, but more
contentious. On the way these processes become more visible in culturally contentious societies, see, Larry
Cati Backer, Poor Relief, Welfare Paralysis, and Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L. Rv. 1, 5-15, 18-30 (contention
and interpretation in the law of public benefits).
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For a long time, commentators have been content to describe the general
principles by other names, such as privacy, "substantive" due process, and
others.'34 It is time to see the practice for what it is-the construction of new
restraints on the relationship between government and its citizens which are
drawn from out of the overtones of our basic law and within the limits of the
hugely exploded traditional categories of constitutional interpretation.
The cases decided this term provide a road-map for the construction and
use of the emerging principle of fairness. This is not to say that the work of
constructing general principles of constitutional law is new. Our Court has been
traveling this road for at least a generation. Consider the way in which our
Court has fashioned what amounts to the general principle of respect for per-
sonal autonomy we commonly call "privacy.' '135 Yet this enterprise created a
furor among "traditionalists" who saw the enterprise as a naked power play on
the part of liberal judges masquerading as legislators--our "constitutional time
bomb."'136 What makes this so surprising is that the task of continuing the
construction of these principles now appears to be the property of centrists and
even the most traditionalist members of the court.
Thus, it is with a great deal of irony that I end with a quote from Robert
Bork. He has seen the Supreme Court articulate those guiding principles of
general law necessary to breathe life into the Constitution. He views the prac-
tice with horror, in light of the experiences of the European Court of Justice as
it struggles with its own Constitution, and the two hundred year application of
these principles by our Court, I view the practice as necessary. What troubles
me is the continuing need, perhaps because of the vehemence and political
importance of views such as those of Mr. Bork, that such an enterprise has had
to be hidden from view.
From era to era, the values the Court writes into the Constitution change.
As new values are added, the old ones are dropped. The Court's perfor-
mance, in terms of favored values, displays no single political trajectory
over time. Moreover, the style of the Court's theorizing varies, as does the
provision of the Constitution used to provide an appearance that what is
being done is related in some legitimate manner to the actual docu-
ment.' 7
134. Robert Bork, though inveighing bitterly against the practice of creating and applying general princi-
ples of constitutional law and then applying them by means of the obscurationist language of constitutional
jurisprudence, nevertheless well describes the long tradition within the Supreme Court of crafting and apply-
ing extra-constitutional general principles of law as an aid to the interpretation and understanding of the Con-
stitution. See BORK, supra note 11, at 130.
135. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
136. See BORK, supra note 11, at 95-100 (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
137. BORK, supra note 11, at 130 (1990). Where Mr. Bork goes wrong, as do many current so-called
conservatives, is in the further assertion that this resort to extra-constitutional principles of constitutional law
"means that we are increasingly governed not by law or elected representatives, but by an unelected, unrepre-
sentative, unaccountable committee of lawyers applying no will but their own." Id. How sad to have so miser-
able a perception of the people we have appointed to so lofty a function. I prefer to view the enterprise of
general principles as the search for what Justice Holmes understood "fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law" as the method by which "rational and fair"
people can judge the legitimacy, within the parameters of that social compact we call our Constitution, of the
19971
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